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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this study was to investigate whether firm diversification can effect to earnings 
management in manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. Diversification was 
measured using number of segments owned by the firm. Earnings management was measured 
using modified Jones. Samples of this study are 100 manufacturing firms from 2003 to 2007 
period. The samples are collected from database Indonesia Stock Exchange. This research uses 
purposive sampling to collect data. Technique of collecting data in this research is Archival. One 
of archival technique is secondary data. The results of analysis showed that diversified firms 
positively influence earnings management. It was seen that the existence of earnings management 
is high for the company's multi-segment. It provided additional funds in order to allocate funds in 
its business segments so that segment grew older and survive despite the less profitable segment. 
In fact, they exploited the weakness of the external parties who do not know the actual financial 
information to show that the company has good business prospects. The result supports the 
research hypothesis.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this research is to investigate whether firm diversification can 
effect earnings management. Diversification is a form of corporate business development 
by expanding the number of segments both business and geographic. A firm implements 
strategy of diversification when it operates in an industry or market a wide range 
simultaneously. Strategy of product diversification is applied when the firm is operating 
in industries varied simultaneously. In Indonesia, PT Unilever Indonesia Tbk diversify its 
product as blue band (margarine), lifebuoy (soap and shampoo), pepsodent (toothpaste), 
sariwangi (tea), rexona (deodorant), and etc. The company diversifies its products to 
meet consumers' needs.  
Strategy of geographical diversification is conducted when the firm operates in 
the geographical market simultaneously. The case in Indonesia, PT Berlian Laju Tanker 
Tbk has diversified its business through establishment of new businesses such as 
offshore, strengthening of liquid gas cargo transportation, and also geographical 
expansion through intensification of transportation to several regions outside Asia such as 
the Mediterranean, Africa, Europe and Latin America. It will improve the firm’s 
flexibility and its ability to operate its fleet in areas offering profitable margins. 
 
In general, the diversified firms are defined as a firm has two or more business 
segments. Sometime the diversified firms have lower operating profits than the firms 
have a single business segment (non diversified firms). This situation is related to 
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excessive investment by the firm. It results lower operating profit because distortions in 
allocating internal capital to inefficient projects funded at higher risk.  
 
Stultz (1990) has suggested that the diversified firm will invest too large in line its 
business with low opportunities. While Jensen (1986) has argued that manager with large 
free cash flow will invest to a project which is negative net present value. It occurs as 
he/she alocates the resource to his/her segment business. 
 
In addition, the manager tends to manage earnings to show opportunities in the 
future. It will raise funds to allocate funds in its segment business. Therefore, these 
segments are increasing rapidly and endure even the less profitable segment. In fact, 
manager also exploits weakness of external parties who do not know the true financial 
information (Lim et al., 2008). It will raise managers’ private benefits. Based on these 
conditions, the issue of this research is whether firm diversification in Indonesia 
positively influences to earnings management. The result of this study is firm 
diversification positively influence earnings management. It means that more firm 
diversification is more opportunities manager to manage earnings.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follow section 2 presents theoretical and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 discusses research methods.  Section 4 reports the 
empirical results and Section 5 concludes the result of this research. 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2. 1. Firm Diversification and Earnings Management 
Montgomery et al. (1994) has suggested that three motive of corporate 
diversification are (1) the view of market power (market power view), (2) resources 
(resources based view), and (3) the perspective of agency (agency view). In the financial 
literature, agency theory is an important role in explaining the relationship between 
principals and agents in carrying out the functions and powers of each others. Agency 
conflict arises because the divergence of interests leads to problems among the involved 
various parties (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In the context of conflicts of interest, 
diversification policy is not maximal.  Managers will direct the diversification in 
accordance with their interests. It is like measurement managerial performances depend 
on sales. Therefore, diversification is effective tool to increase revenue of the firm while 
it does not yield a positive net present value. As a result, the diversification will reduce 
value of the firm. 
 
Jensen (1986) has focused on the agency problems of overinvestment. He has 
argued that excess cash flow relative to needed for dividend and debt payments allows. It 
is too much flexibility to managers to make diversifying investments into low return 
projects. Firms with high free cash flows and low investment opportunities have 
incentives to expand beyond their optimal size as lead to high levels of firm 
diversification. They are some incentive to managers to (1) increase the firm resources 
under their control, (2) provide promotional opportunities for middle managers and serve 
an integral component for motivational and reward system in the company, and (3) 
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enhance managerial compensation which tends to increase with organizational 
responsibility and size. It causes problem because managers with high free cash flow and 
low investment opportunities find it difficult to resist the temptation to grow. It is 
expected returns fail to exceed the cost of capital. 
 
Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) has explained that the 
investment opportunities of diversified firms are lower compared to non diversified firms. 
Chen and Steiner (2000) have also explained that firm diversification is a function of 
excess discretionary cash flow and managerial risk considerations. Chen and Steiner 
(2000) has founded that the level of excess discretionary funds in the firm is positive and 
significant influence the level of firm diversification. Whited (2001) has argued that 
diversified firms differ from non diversified firms in two important aspects (1) cash flows 
and (2) investment opportunities. Diversified firms generate higher free cash flows than 
non diversified firms. Ruland and Zhou (2005) have suggested diversified firms have 
higher free cash flow and fewer high net present value investment opportunities. It leads 
the agency costs because the potential overinvestment is greater for diversified firms.  
  
Goldberg and Heflin (1995) and Reeb et al. (1998) have argued that a firm’s 
information environment is more complex when it is more diversified geographically. 
Herrmann et al. (2010) also explains that more geographically diversified firms create a 
more complex information environment. Increased information asymmetries between 
managers and owners in diversified firms will lead to overinvestment and miss allocation 
of resources (Stulz, 1990; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002). Lim et al. (2008) has also 
suggested that information asymmetry is more severe for diversified firms compared to 
non diversified firms. With increased geographically diversified firm increases 
organizational complexity and information asymmetry between managers and investors.  
Managers have incentive to exploit these discretions to make self-maximizing decision, 
which decreases firm value. Rather than using the internal capital market as a means of 
allocating resources optimally, managers use the cash flow generated by healthy 
segments to subsidize under performing segments (Lamont, 1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998; 
and Rajan et al., 2000). The information asymmetry and agency problems are more 
serious in a diversified firm relative to non diversified firm. The agency costs also arising 
due to the separation of ownership and management are exacerbated in diversified firms 
(Denies et al. 1997). 
 
One of the reasons why managers engage in geographical diversification may be 
to derive private benefits from managing a geographically diversified firm (e.g., Stulz, 
1981; Jensen, 1986). The private benefits include prestige or better career prospects 
associated with running a geographical firm, higher pay, and opportunities for 
entrenchment when they become more valuable to a more complex firm (Reeb et al., 
2001). To avoid private benefits, managers tend to manage earnings. The more 
complexity and information asymmetry are large incentive for manager to engage 
earnings management. The opportunity to manage earnings is likely to be higher the 
greater the level of information asymmetry (Dye, 1988; Trueman and Titman, 1988). 
Loughran and Ritter (1997), Rangan (1998), and Teoh et al. (1998) have shown that 
earnings management is usually not transparent to investors. It will cost for the firm when 
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the discovery of the presence of earnings management. It will reduce the credibility of the 
firm and impair its subsequent ability to raise capital at favorable terms. Richardson 
(2000) has also provided empirical evidence that earnings management is greater for 
firms with a higher level of information asymmetry.  
 
Lim et al. (2008) has argued that the extent of information asymmetry is varying 
between diversified and non diversified firms. The accounting information of a 
diversified firm may be nosier than non diversified firm because the nature of the 
diversified firm’s accounting reports. Divisional cash flows of diversified firms are 
observable by its managers but they are not known to outsiders and only noisy estimates 
are available. Thus, consolidated earnings reports convey little value relevant information 
about the divisions. It is misleading and cost for the outsiders. Lim et al. (2008) has 
shown that diversified firms are more aggressive in managing earnings than non 
diversified firms. It is conditioned upon degree of business complexity in a diversified 
firm. Chin et al. (2010) also finds that greater corporate internationalization is associated 
with a higher level of earnings management.  
 
Hope and Thomas (2008) has shown that when information asymmetries induced 
by geographically diversified firms increase, managers are more likely to build empire in 
foreign. To mask the adverse effect of these suboptimal decisions arising from their 
discretion on firm performance, managers have the incentive to manage aggressive 
earnings. Expansion into international markets increases the complexity of information 
processing for investors. This situation induces managers tend to engage in a higher level 
of earnings management as information asymmetry increases. It leads managers to 
exploit this additional level of information asymmetry to manage earnings.  
 
We follow Healy and Wahlen’s (1999) earnings management definition. 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings management occurs when managers 
used judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance 
of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers. Hann and Lu (2009) document that managers have discretion on the 
considerations of cost allocation process. The managers have incentive and ability to 
manipulate earnings in order to prevent segment losses. In addition, another explanation 
by Bens et al. (2008) investigating the relationship between income smoothing and 
segments with the conservatism of accounting earnings. Ben et al. (2008) have 
documented that income smoothing among segments associated with greater information 
asymmetry between outside investors and insider. 
 
Moreover, diversified firm will affect the agency cost when its complexity of 
organizational form is increase (Denis et al., 1997). Organizational complexity can create 
problems between asymmetric information and expropriation problem. In this situation, 
the problem is difficult to detect. Guidry et al. (1999) also found that managers of a 
multinational conglomerate manipulated earnings to maximize its short-term bonus plan. 
The more information asymmetry between management and investors creates an 
opportunity for managers to manage earnings. The information asymmetry is more acute 
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among diversified firms. We expect that degree of diversified firm is positively 
associated with earnings management proxied by the level of discretionary current 
accruals. 
H1: Firm diversification positively effect on earnings management. 
 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
3. 1. Sample 
Sampling methods in this study based on purposive sampling with specified 
criteria as follows: 
a. Sample a group of manufacturing industries in Indonesia Stock Exchange and has a 
segment between the years 2003 to 2007. 
b. The firm publishes financial reports from 2002 until 2007. 
c. The firm should have a comprehensive financial report, including an explanation 
and disclosure of segment. 
d. The firm has more than one business segment. 
 
Table 1 Screenings process of research sample  
Criteria Sum 
Sample is a group of manufacturing industry in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange and has a segment from 2003 until 2007 
97 
Sample does not publish financial statement  during 5 years  (48) 
Sample does not have the end of accounting period on December 31 (15) 
Sample does not have a complete financial report, including an 
explanation and disclosure of segment reporting  
(8) 
Sample does not have more than one business segment  (6) 
Final Sample 20 
 
3.2. Data and Sources of Data 
Data used in this study is historical data. Secondary data is collected from 100 
manufacturing companies during five years. Data is collected from various sources as 
Exchange Corner Atma Jaya Yogyakarta University and PDBE Gadjah Mada University. 
 
3. 3. Operational Definition and Measurement Variable 
a. Independent variable in this research is diversification. Diversification (diversified 
firms) is a form of business development by expanding the business and 
geographical segments. Diversification is measured by counting the number of 
segments that are owned by the firm.  
There are six control variables as growth, leverage, inside, institutional, decline, and loss. 
b. Growth (growth opportunities) is a growth company that is a corporate investment 
opportunity. In this case, it is measured by the amount of change in sales. Gul et 
al. (2003) documents that manager of high growth companies more often manage 
earnings to inform about the firm's growth opportunities in the future. 
c. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to equity. If funding is obtained through debt 
means that the risk of debt to equity ratio will increase. Ultimately it will increase 
risk and uncertainty to obtain profits in the future. 
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d. Inside (managerial ownership) is the ownership of shares held by management. 
Stock ownership by the management will motivate managers to manage firm very 
well.  Inside (managerial ownership) is measured by the percentage ownership of 
shares held by managers. 
e. Institutional (institutional ownership) is the ownership of shares held by 
institutional investors. The presence of institutional ownership such as insurance 
companies, banks, investment companies, and ownership by other institutions 
encourage a more optimal control to management performance. Institutional 
(institutional ownership) is measured by the percentage ownership of shares held 
by institutional investors. 
f.   Decline is an effort to prevent reducing profits by managers. 
g.   Loss is loss is efforts to prevent declining firm performance so that the firm is 
look better in investors and creditors. 
h. Dependent variable in this research is earnings management. Earnings 
Management is an act of management affecting reported earnings and misleading 
financial information. Discretional current accrual is proxy for earnings 
management. It is measured using cross-sectional model of the modified Jones 
(Dechow et al., 1995). 
 
3.4. Data Analysis Method  
Data are analyzed the following steps.  
a. Diversification measure based on the number of companies owned by business 
segment.  
b. Discretionary Current Accrual is calculated using the modified Jones model. 
CA = Δ (Current Assets - Cash) – Δ (Current Liabilities – Current Portion 
of Long Term Debt ) 
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Where TA is total assets of firm i at year t. ΔREV is the change in earnings of firm i in 
year t. εit is the random residual term. 
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DCA is disrecretionary current accruals. Empirical model to test hypothesis is as follow. 
EMit=β0+β1DIVERSIFICATIONit+β2GROWTHit+β3LEVit+β4INSIDEit+β5INSTit+ 
β6DECLINEit+β7LOSSit+εit        (1) 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
No. Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
1. Diversification 1.00 5.00 3.0500 1.11351 
2. Growth -0.82 2.58 0.1222 0.45405 
3. Leverage -69.98 117.70 2.1217 15.16565 
4. Inside 0.00 83.21 1.9842 9.94192 
5. Institutional 0.10 100.00 69.2281 24.64692 
6. Decline 0.00 1.00 0.5600 0.49889 
7. Loss 0.00 1.00 0.4000 0.49237 
8. Earning management -1.02 0.95 -0.0127 0.26567 
 
The results of descriptive statistics in Table 2 suggest that the variable of 
diversification (diversified firms) has a minimum value of 1.00 and a maximum value of 
5.00. Growth (growth opportunities) has a minimum value of -0.82 and a maximum value 
of 2.58. Leverage has a minimum value of -68.98 and a maximum value of 117.70. Inside 
(managerial ownership) have a minimum value of 0.00 and a maximum value of 83.21. 
Institutional (institutional ownership) has a minimum value of 0.10 and a maximum value 
of 100.00. Decline (prevention of falls in profits) has a minimum value of 0.00 and a 
maximum value of 1.00. Loss (loss prevention) has a minimum value of 0.00 and a 
maximum value of 1.00. Earnings management (earnings management) has a minimum 
value of -1.02 and a maximum value of 0.95. 
 
4. 2. Test of Hypothesis 
Table 3 the Result of Analysis 
EMit=β0+β1DIVERSIFICATIONit+β2GROWTHit+β3LEVit+β4INSIDEit+β5INSTit+ 
β6DECLINEit+β7LOSSit+εit 
Variable Coefficients t-statistic p-value 
Constant -.147 -1.692 .094* 
DIVERSIFICATION .044 2.094 .039** 
GROWTH .164 3.977 .000*** 
LEV .003 2.654 .009*** 
INSIDE -.006 -3.291 .001*** 
INST -.002 -2.517 .014* 
DECLINE .150 3.495 .001*** 
LOSS .089 2.418 .018** 
    
Adjusted R
2
 0.574   
F-statistik 20.062   
Probabilitas F-statistik .000   
N 100   
***, **, *= significant at  alpha 0,01; 0,05; and 0,1. 
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Before testing of hypothesis, this research tests classical assumption. The results 
show normal distribution. There are not heterocedastity, autocorrelation, multicoliniarity. 
The results of regression analysis based on Table 3 show coefficient of diversification 
(diversified firms) are positive and significant. The results suggest that diversified firm 
positively influence earnings management. It means manager of diversified firm to 
manage earnings. The results are consistent with research Stulz (1990), Han et al. (2008), 
and Lim et al. (2008) which states that higher information asymmetry between managers 
and owners of diversified firm. Because the many segments owned can lead to excessive 
investment and allocate resources. It is not appropriate because managers use cash flow 
from healthy segments to hide low performing from the other segments.  
 
The results also show that growth variables positively and significant influence 
earnings management. Positive effect on investment opportunities for earnings 
management indicates that the firm's investment opportunities with high growth most 
common smoothing earnings. Leverage variable positively and significant influences 
earnings management. the positive effect leverage to earnings management because 
according to the debt covenant hypothesis which states that the closer the firm with 
violations of accounting-based debt covenant, managers tends to choose accounting 
procedures that move from reported earnings in the next period to the current period.  
 
Inside variable (managerial ownership) influences negatively and significant to 
earnings management. It indicates that manager is not interested to manage earnings. 
Manager aligns his/her interest with the various interests. Institutional variables influence 
negatively and significant to earnings management. It indicates that the ownership of 
shares by institutions can oversee opportunistic behavior of managers using earnings 
management to private interests. Decline variable (prevention of falls in profits) 
influences positively and significant to earnings management. It indicates that the strong 
motivation of managers to perform in order to prevent the decline in earnings accrued so 
that the company is not threatened bankruptcy.  Loss variable (loss prevention) influences 
positively and significant to earnings management. It indicates managers to avoid losses 
(loss). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This study concludes that diversified firm positively influences earnings 
management. The results suggest that the many segments will require the large funds. It 
can lead to manage earnings. In addition, firm tends to reduce taxes by reducing earnings 
in all segments when its profit is high. It occurs because the many segments will facilitate 
to reduce tax payment. The results of this study do not represent all companies in the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange. This study only uses manufacturing companies as sample. 
The future research can use more types of diversification. It also represents all types of 
industries and differences earnings management in all industries.  
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